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ARTICLES
INVALID RESERVATIONS TO THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: IS THE UNITED
STATES STILL A PARTY?
by William A. Schabas"
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 1992, the United States deposited its instru-
ment of accession to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant).' The Covenant came into force for
the United States three months later, when it became the one
hundred and fifteenth state party to a treaty which constitutes
the cornerstone of modern international human rights law. The
United States accompanied its accession with several reser-
vations and interpretative declarations, two of which seek to
exclude from the Covenant's scope2 current practices relating
to the death penalty. Eleven European states parties to the
Covenant filed objections condemning these reservations as
invalid.' Although the United States has not recognized the
individual petition mechanism set out in the Optional Protocol
to the Covenant,4 it is bound, under article 40, to submit peri-
* William A. Schabas, MA., LL.D., Professor of Law and Chairman,
D~partement des sciences juridiques, Universit6 du Quebec A Montrdal. The author
would like to thank Katia Boustany and Markus Schmidt for their helpful com-
ments to early drafts of this paper.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
2. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STATUS
AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, at 117, 118, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SEREJ13, U.N. Sales No.
E.95.V.I (1995) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31,
19941.
3. Id. at 123.
4. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
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odic reports on its compliance to the Human Rights Committee
(Committee).5 When the first of these reports was examined by
the Committee, in March and April 1995, it affinmed that at
least some elements of the reservations dealing with the death
penalty are "incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Covenant," and, consequently, these reservations are invalid.'
In its statement on the reservations, the Committee did
not discuss the consequences of such a conclusion, although
this issue is of considerable legal significance. If the invalid
reservations can be severed or separated from the U.S. acces-
sion to the treaty, then the United States remains bound by
the Covenant, including its provisions dealing with the death
penalty. Therefore, the United States would be in breach of its
international obligations. Article 6, paragraph 5 of the Cove-
nant prohibits executions of individuals for crimes committed
while they were under the age of eighteen.! However, state
governments have carried out such executions on several occa-
sions since September 1992, when the Covenant came into
force for the United States. Furthermore, the United States
would also be in violation of article 7, which prohibits, accord-
ing to the Committee, execution by asphyxiation in the gas
chamber, as practiced in California.8
Alternatively, if the invalid reservations cannot be sepa-
rated from the U.S. accession, then the United States is not a
party to the instrument. This result would be a terrible blow to
the protection of human rights within the United States as
well as a setback to the universal system of human rights of
which the Covenant is the centerpiece. It would also call into
question the validity of recent elections to the Committee, in
which the United States participated as a state party.9 In par-
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 41,
999 U.N.T.S. at 181.
6. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of
the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee, 53d Seas., 1413th mtg.
14, at 4, U.N. Doc. CCPRICI79/Add.50 (1995) [hereinafter Consideration of Re-
ports].
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 6,
5, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
8. Views of the Human Rights Committee: Communication No. 469/1991, Ng
v. Canada, 49th Sess., Annex, at 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1993)
[hereinafter Communication No. 469/1991].
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 30,
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ticular, the position of Thomas Buergenthal, who was recently
elected to the Committee after being nominated by the United
States, would be in doubt."
The belated ratification of the Covenant by the United
States completed a process begun forty-five years earlier by
Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the early sessions of the Unit-
ed Nations Commission on Human Rights (Commission) as it
prepared the initial drafts of the instrument." Following elec-
tion of a Republican administration in 1952, Roosevelt was
replaced on the Commission, and the new representatives
announced that the United States no longer had any intention
of ratifying the instrument. 2 Until their conclusion in 1966,
the United States continued to attend the debates concerning
the drafting of the Covenant in the Commission and in the
Third Committee of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, it did
not play an active part and abstained from voting.3 In Febru-
ary 1978, President Jimmy Carter submitted the Covenant to
the Senate for its advice and consent, in accordance with the
U.S. Constitution. 4 However, the matter was not further pur-
sued under the Reagan administration. 5 Finally, in late 1991,
President Bush resubmitted the treaty to the Senate, accompa-
4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 180.
10. Members of the Committee must be nominated by states parties. Id. art.
29. Moreover, they must be nationals of a state party. Id. art. 29, q 2.
11. Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS at 32, 33, 39 (Louis Henldn ed.,
1981).
12. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 825 (1953) (statement of John Foster
Dulles, Secretary of State).
13. See David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights
Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35, 40 (1978).
14. U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT
RESERVATIONS? 85-87 app. (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981) (President's Message to
the Senate Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights); Weissbrodt,
supra note 13, at 36.
15. The Reagan administration did, however, proceed with ratification of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, some-
thing that had been proposed by U.S. presidents since Truman. Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 278 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention];
see Nicholas F. Kourtis & Joseph M. Titlebaum, U.S. Foreign Policy, International
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: United
States Senate Grant of Advice and Consent to Ratification, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS.
Y.B. 227, 232-233 (1988); Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not
Going to Get Away With It, 11 MICH. J. INTL L. 90, 99 (1989).
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nied by the controversial reservations, and ratification was
authorized early in 1992.16
The U.S. government associated its acceptance of the Cov-
enant with no less than five reservations, four interpretative
declarations and five "understandings"-an unprecedented
number."7 Some of these reservations, declarations and under-
standings echo similar statements made by other states parties
at the time of their ratification or accession, and are not partic-
ularly controversial. 8 The same cannot be said of the reser-
vations to articles 6 and 7, which concern the death penalty.
Article 6 of the Covenant reads as follows:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment ren-
dered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide,
it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize
any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any
way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek
pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or
commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all
cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes commit-
16. For the Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations recommending ac-
cession to the Covenant, see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT ON
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No.
23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 21 (1992) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT].
17. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2,
at 125-26.
18. They include reservations to article 20 (prohibition of hate propaganda),
article 15 1 (right to the lesser punishment where it has been reduced since
commission of the crime), and to articles 10 q 2(b), 10 3, and 14 9 4 (with
respect to detention of juveniles). See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC.
31, 1994, supra note 2.
280 [Vol. MX:2
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ted by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be
carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to pre-
vent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party
to the present Covenant. 9
The U.S. reservation to article 6 states:
That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Con-
stitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any
person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital
punishment, including such punishment for crimes commit-
ted by persons below eighteen years of age. °
Article 7 reads as follows:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or
scientific experimentation.2
The U.S. reservation to article 7 states:
The United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the
extent that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment" means the cruel and unusual treatment or punish-
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 6,
99I 1-6, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
20. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at
126. For additional discussion on the reservations, see M. Christian Green, The
'Matrioshka' Strategy: US Evasion of the Spirit of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 357 (1994); Louis Henkin,
Editorial Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995); Ved P. Nanda, The United States
Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1311 (1993); John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of
the United States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59 (1993); Edward F. Sherman, Note, The U.S.
Death Penalty Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible System Governing Treaty Formula-
tion, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 69 (1994); David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Under-
standings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77, 82 (1993).
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 7,
at 175.
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ment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States.22
The reservation to article 6 does not merely contemplate
the execution of juvenile offenders, as has sometimes been
suggested.' The specific and otherwise superfluous mention
that the United States reserves the right to impose the death
penalty in situations "including" crimes committed by offenders
under the age of eighteen makes the intention to do so quite
clear. Furthermore, the intention to give a broad scope to the
reservation is also evidenced in the explanation submitted by
the Bush administration to the Senate. It notes in particular
"the sharply differing view taken by many of our future treaty
partners on the issue of the death penalty (including what
constitutes 'serious crimes' under article 6(2)). "24 This expla-
nation leaves no doubt that the reservation looks far beyond
the question of juvenile executions and intends to exclude the
United States from virtually all international norms respecting
the death penalty. Unquestionably, the reservation to article 7
is intended to avoid the precedent established by the European
Court of Human Rights in the case of Soering v. United King-
dom,2 as the comments submitted by President Bush to Con-
gress make abundantly clear.2 ' The U.S. administration has
imposed a similar condition, known as "the Soering under-
standing,"' to its ratification of the Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
22. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at
126.
23. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 20, at 82. The reservation was presented in
this fashion to the Committee by the United States representative, on March 29,
1995. See also Human Rights Committee Begins Considering Initial Report of
United States, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1401st mtg., U.N. Doe. HR/CT/400
(Mar. 29, 1995), available in >gopherlt/gopher.undp.org:70/100/uncurr/press-releases
TIICT/95_03/400; Maria N. Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 589, 591 (1995) (U.S.
Presentation Before the Human Rights Committee (1995)).
24. FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 16, at 11.
25. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council has reached a similar conclusion. See Pratt v. Attorney Gen., 4 All. ER.
769 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jamaica), cited in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 338
(1993); see also Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimb. v. Attorney Gen.,
Judgment No. S.C. 73/93 (June 24, 1993), cited in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 323 (1993).
26. FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 16, at 12.
27. Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INTVL L. 128, 148 (1991).
282 [Vol. XXI:2
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Punishment (Torture Convention)."
It is a common practice in the making of reservations to
give specific references to the domestic legislation that the
state party intends to shelter from the treaty." This practice
gives great precision to a reservation, and helps other states
parties to establish their own positions with, respect to the
reservation, in full knowledge of its implications." The United
States chose not to follow this route and, consequently, the
legality of its reservation must be assessed with reference to
the worst possible hypotheses. For example, in excluding only
pregnant women from the death penalty, the United States
leaves open the possibility of execution of very young chil-
dren,3 the insane, or the severely mentally handicapped.32
28. Reports of the Secretary-General, GA. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
39th Sess., 93d plen. mtg., Annex, Agenda Item 99, at 1665, U.N. Doc. A/39/PV.93
(1985); 22 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 395-99 (Dusan J. Dionovich ed., 1988);
see also Torture Convention Adopted After Seven Years' Work, 22 UN CHRON. 31
(1985); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1994) (entered into force June 26, 1987). The United States ratified the Torture
Convention on October 21, 1994. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31,
1994, supra note 2, at 177, 179; see also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Hu-
man Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341
(1995).
29. In some cases, the state making the reservation to the treaty is required
to give specific references to domestic legislation. See Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 64, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, 252 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention on
Human Rights]. On reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights,
see Jochen Abr. Frowein, Reservations to the European Convention on Human
Rights, in PROTECTING HUIAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 193 (Franz
Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1988); S. Marcus-Helmons, L'article 64 de la
Convention de Rome ou les rfserves & la Convention europdenne des droits de
l'homme, 45 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARe [R.D. INT'L &
D. COMP.] 7 (1968); William A. Schabas, Article 64, in LA CONVENTION
EUROP9ENNE DES DROITS DE LHOMME: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 923
(LE. Pettiti et al. eds., 1995).
30. On the unacceptability of vague or imprecise reservations, see Temeltasch
v. Switzerland, App. No. 9116/80, 31 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 138, 145-49
(1983); see also Pierre-Henri Imbert, Les roserves a la Convention europ6enne des
droits de l'homme devant la Commission de Strasbourg (Affaire Temeltasch), 1983
REVUE GNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [REV. GtN. D. INT'L PUB.] 580,
translated in 33 INT'L. & COMIP. L.Q. 558 (1984).
31. Several states have no restriction on execution of children. Others set
minimum ages going as low as twelve. The age limit for executions according to
the Constitution is still unclear. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
32. See William A. Schabas, International Norms on Execution of the Insane
and the Mentally Retarded, 4 CRIM. LS. 95 (1993).
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By reserving the norm requiring that the death penalty be
imposed for only the "most serious crimes," even in the future,
the United States allows for capital punishment for crimes
without violence, crimes against morality, or political crimes.
In making a reservation to the "arbitrary" use of the death
penalty, the United States permits imposition of death sen-
tences in the absence of stringent procedural safeguards, going
as far as the suspension of the presumption of innocence. 3
The method of execution is also excluded from the scope of the
Covenant by the reservation to article 7. Consequently, the
reservation would allow the United States to impose unques-
tionably inhuman punishments, such as stoning or public be-
heading, without running afoul of its obligations under the
Covenant.
It is an insufficient answer to cite the reference to the U.S.
Constitution in the reservations to articles 6 and 7, and argue
that domestic law provides incomparable protection. Even if
the U.S. Constitution now offers satisfactory guarantees in
death row cases, its interpretation may vary over time and,
furthermore, it is subject to amendment. Article 27 of the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "[a] party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justifica-
tion for its failure to perform a treaty."' Reservations to hu-
man rights treaties that make general allusions to domestic
law have frequently been criticized for vagueness and have
often provoked formal objections."
33. At the very least, in a time of national emergency, the fair trial provisions
could be suspended pursuant to article 4 of the Covenant. Although procedural
safeguards in the United States are, at present, fairly comprehensive, there is still
room for improvement. For example, the United States Supreme Court refused to
intervene in a case where a man sentenced to death had found considerable evi-
dence demonstrating his innocence. ilerrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). In-
ternational human rights bodies might well side with Justice Blackmun's dissent
in which he stated that the reasoning of the majority had come "perilously close
to simple murder." Id.
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
35. The United States accompanied its ratification of the Genocide Convention,
supra note 15, with a similar reference to the United States Constitution. Kourtis
& Titlebaum, supra note 15, at 230-31. Objections to this reservation were filed by
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Mexico, Norway, the United Kingdom, Spain and Sweden. MULTILATERAL TREATIES,
STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at 87-89. The objections cited the un-
certainty of such reservations, and in some cases referred to art. 27 of the Vienna
284 [Vol. MXI2
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In its comments on the initial report by the United States
concerning compliance with the Covenant, issued April 6, 1995,
the Committee declared the reservations to article 6, para-
graph 5 (although not to article 6 as a whole) and article 7 to
be invalid."6 In accordance with Committee practice, the com-
ments were adopted by consensus with no further explanation
or justification for such a conclusion. Some guidance as to the
Committee's views may, however, be found in the individual
comments of Committee members made during the presenta-
tion of the initial report." This article attempts to explain the
Committee's position and to examine the legality of the U.S.
reservations to the death penalty provisions of the Covenant in
the light of the comments by Committee members, the objec-
tions formulated by other states parties, and general sources of
public international law. The examination of the reservations'
legality is followed by a discussion of the Committee's compe-
tence to make such conclusions and of the consequences of a
finding of illegality with respect to the rights and obligations of
a contracting state.
II. THE LEGALITY OF RESERVATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
A determination of the legality of the U.S. reservations
first involves a finding as to the admissibility and permissible
scope of reservations in general. Some jurists have argued that
reservations to substantive provisions are excluded by the very
nature of human rights conventions, although the prevailing
view appears to be that reservations are permitted, even to
non-derogable provisions, provided they do not deprive the pro-
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id.; see also Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.
13, 22 (Article 24 provides that "[s]tates parties undertake to adopt all necessary
measures at the national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Convention."); Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention
Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM.
J. INTL. L. 281, 310-12 (1991).
36. Consideration of Reports, supra note 6.
37. Human Rights Committee Concludes Consideration of Initial Report of
United States, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1406th mtg., U.N. Doc. HRICT/405
(1995), available in>gopher'i/gopher.undp.org:70/00/uncurr/press.releases/HR/CT/
95_03/405, [hereinafter Hum. Rts. Comm. Concludes Consideration of U.S. Initial
Report].
1995]
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vision in question of its basic purpose. An examination of this
issue requires a study of the travaux pr6paratoires as well as
other sources. In this respect, helpful reference may be made
to reservations to the death penalty provisions found in other
human rights and humanitarian law treaties, as well as to the
status of the death penalty in customary international law.
A. The System of Reservations to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights
While it is open to the drafters of a multilateral treaty to
excludem or to permit 9 the possibility of reservations, or to
limit their scope in either form40 or content,4' no such provi-
sion was included in the Covenant.42 Traditionally, the law of
38. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, done Sept. 7, 1956, art. 9, 266
U.N.T.S. 3, 44 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957); Convention Against Discrimina-
tion in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1960, art. 9, 429 U.N.T.S. 93, 102 (entered
into force May 22, 1962); Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, done Apr. 28, 1983, art. 4, Europ. T.S. No. 114.
39. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar.
31, 1953, art. VII, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, 140 (entered into force July 7, 1954).
40. Article 64 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides no limi-
tation on the content of reservations, other than that they must not be "general."
Supra note 29, 213 U.N.T.S. at 252. However, it imposes several requirements of
form, such as the need to cite the domestic legislation being reserved, and to pro-
vide a brief description of this legislation. Id.
41. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 42, 1 1,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, 182 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); Convention on the Na-
tionality of Married Women, done Feb. 20, 1957, art. 8, 309 U.N.T.S. 65, 71-72
(entered into force Aug. 11, 1958); International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 20, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 236 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Convention on
Elimination of Racial Discrimination]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, art. VII, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 272-74 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art.
28, supra note 35, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 23; see also American Convention on Human
Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," adopted Nov. 22, 1969, art. 75, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 161 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Conven-
tion on Human Rights]. This Convention expressly adopts the regime of the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 34, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
337, which is tantamount to allowing reservations that are not contrary to the
"object and purpose" of the instrument. Id.
42. For a review of the travaux prdparatoires dealing with the issue of reser-
vations, see PIERRE-HENRI IMBERT, LES RMSERVES AUX TRAITtS MULTILAT2RAUX 411-
13 (1979); Pierre-Henri Imbert, Les riserves, les ddrogations: La question des
rdserves et les conventions en mathre de droits de l'homne, in ACTES DU
CINQUITME COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL SUR LA CONVENTION EUROPfPENNE DES DROITS
286
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treaties contemplated reservations in a contract law context, as
a form of counter-offer, requiring manifestations of express or
tacit acceptance before the treaty, as reserved, could come into
force between states parties. In 1951, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) recognized that, in the absence of a provision
to the contrary, reservations to multilateral treaties are per-
missible to the extent that they do not conflict with the "object
and purpose" of the treaty.43 The Court ruled, in a seven to
five decision, that classic rules derived from the law of con-
tracts cannot easily be applied in the multilateral treaty con-
text.44 In that opinion, the Court found that the contracting
parties to the Genocide Convention wanted to stimulate wide-
spread ratification and did not intend that "an objection to a
minor reservation" should result in inapplicability.45 The "ob-
ject and purpose" principle stated in the Court's advisory opin-
ion has since been codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.46
The possibility of reservation facilitates the ratification of
treaties, encouraging their acceptance by states that generally
respect the obligations set out but fail to comply on one or
another point. However, the widespread use of reservations in
human rights treaties has been frequently criticized for weak-
ening the overall effectiveness of the norms which, by and
DE L'HOMME 119-120, 126-28 (1982), translated in 6 HUM. RTS. REV. 28, 38-39, 42-
43 (1981) [hereinafter Les reserves, les dirogations].
43. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). The Court's opinion was accepted by
the General Assembly. G.A. Res. 598(VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., 360th plen. mtg.
at 84, U.N. Doc. A/L.37 (1952).
44. 1951 I.C.J. at 21.
45. Id. at 24.
46. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 34, art. 19, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 336. On reservations to multilateral treaties, see D. W. Bowett, Reser-
vations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67 (1978); G.
G. Fitzmaurice, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1
(1953); John K. Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic
View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372 (1980); KAYE HOLLOWAY, LES
RgSERVES DANS LES TRAITIS iNTERNATIONAUX (1958); FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS
AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES (1988); IMBERT,
LES RtSERVES AUX TRAIT2S M IJLTILATtRAUX, supra note 42; Inbert, Les rdserves, les
d6rogations, supra note 42; Joseph Nisot, Les Rdserves aux traitds et la Convention
de Vienne du 23 mai 1969, 77 REV. G2N. D. INT'L PUB. 200 (1973); Jose M. Ruda,
Reservations to Treaties, 146 REoUEIL DES COURS DE L'AcADMIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 95 (1975); G6rard Teboul, Remarques sur les r6serves aux
conventions de codification, 86 REV. G9N. D. INT'L PUB. 679 (1982).
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large, are expressed as minimum standards.47 Human rights
treaties have a very high rate of reservation," with the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women49 having the highest number of reservations.
Addressing this problem, the 1992 meeting of the heads of
treaty bodies labelled the practice of reservations to human
rights treaties as "alarming," and concluded that:
each State that is considering ratification of a treaty should
be urged to give the most careful consideration to any pro-
posed reservation thereto and should do its utmost to keep
the number and scope of such reservations to a mini-
mum .... States that are already parties to a particular
treaty should give full consideration to lodging an objection
on each occasion when that may be appropriate."0
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted in
1993 at the close of the World Conference on Human Rights,
urges states to avoid the practice of reservations as much as
possible and to limit the scope of those deemed necessary.51
Approximately forty states parties to the Covenant have
accompanied their instruments of ratification or accession with
reservations or interpretative declarations.52 The largest num-
ber of these are to specific provisions of article 14, which enu-
merates the procedural guarantees essential to a fair trial.
There are also a substantial number of reservations to articles
9, 10, 13, 19 and 20, and a few to articles 1, 4, 6, 8, 12, 15, 21,
22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 48, and 50. There have been only occasional
47. Clark, supra note 35; Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INTL L.
643, 648-50 (1990); FRtD2RIC SUDRE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET EUROP9EN DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME 97-98 (1989).
48. Clark, supra note 35, at 316-20.
49. Id. at 317.
50. Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights,
Including Reporting Obligations under International Instruments on Human Rights:
Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97, at 12, 18,
U.N. Doc. A/471628 (1992).
51. Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, ch. III, at
32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) (1993).
52. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at
118-26. A complete list of reservations to the Covenant is also published in
MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COM-
MENTARY (1993). See also Dinah Shelton, State Practice on Reservations to Human
Rights Treaties, 1983 CAN. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 205, 213-14.
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objections to these reservations.53 A reservation by Trinidad
and Tobago,54 directed at article 4, paragraph 2, article 10,
paragraph 2, article 10, paragraph 3, article 12, paragraph 2,
article 14, paragraph 5, article 14, paragraph 6, article 15,
paragraph 1, article 21 and article 26, was challenged as being
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant in
objections formulated by Germany and the Netherlands.55
Australia's very extensive list of reservations," most of which
have since been withdrawn, provoked an objection from the
Netherlands.57 Korea's reservation,58 which subjected certain
provisions of the Covenant to its own domestic law, was
deemed illegal in objections filed by the former Czechoslovakia,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.59
Prior to the U.S. accession, there had never been a reser-
vation to article 7. Aside from the recent reservation by the
United States, there have been only two other reservations to
article 6 of the Covenant by Norway and Ireland. ° Norway
ratified the Covenant on September 13, 1972, with a reserva-
tion to article 6, paragraph 4.61 Norway later explained that
its legislation did not fully conform to article 6, paragraph 4,
because its military courts could rule that a death sentence be
carried out irrespective of the existence of a right to appeal.62
53. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at
127-30.
54. Id. at 124.
55. Id. at 128.
56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Ratification by Aus-
tralia, Dec. 16, 1966, 1197 U.N.T.S. 411.
57. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at
128.
58. Id. at 123.
59. Id. at 127-30.
60. Id. at 121, 123.
61. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, 999
U.N.T.S. at 172, 297 ("Norway enters reservations with respect to: Article 6, para-
graph 4 . . . ..)
62. Norway: Initial Report, [1977] 2 Y.B.H.R. Comm. 112, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/1/Add.5. Article 6 stated that:
Norwegian law does not fully conform to the requirement in para-
graph 4 prescribing that anyone sentenced to death shall have the right
to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. According to section 242
of the Military Criminal Procedures Act of 29 March 1900 No. 2, there
are no legal remedies against judgments rendered by the Court Martial
and, according to section 243, a Court Martiars sentence of death shall
be carried out immediately. Furthermore, according to section 208 of that
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In practice, Norway had conducted no executions since the
trials of collaborators that followed the Second World War.63
On November 21, 1979, Norway withdrew its reservation to
article 6, paragraph 4," following its abolition of the death
penalty in wartime as well as peacetime. 5 There were no ob-
jections to Norway's reservation by other states parties.
Ireland ratified the Covenant with a reservation to article
6, paragraph 5 that suggested its legislation was inconsistent
with the Covenant. However, the reservation indicated that, in
practice, the Irish government would take into account its
obligations under the Covenant.66 Ireland admitted its legisla-
Act (cf. section 211), the ordinary military courts may, in wartime and
subject to specific conditions, decide that a sentence of death shall be
carried out irrespective of the normal rules of appeal procedure. Accord-
ing to section 18 of the Military Criminal Procedures Act and section 14
of the Act of 15 December 1950 No. 7 relating to Emergency Measures in
Wartime, the King may in certain instances decide that the High Court
(Criminal Division) shall act as the court of final instance so that the
right of appeal ceases to apply.
The reason for these special provisions is that it may well happen
that, in a wartime emergency, the Supreme Court will be cut off from
contact with certain parts of the country or that for other reasons it may
prove impossible to get appeals dealt with by the Supreme Court within
a reasonable space of time.
Before Norway ratified the Covenant, due consideration was given
to the question of amending Norwegian legislation on these points. How-
ever, it was instead decided to make a reservation in respect of para-
graph 4, and the legal situation remains the same today.
Capital punishment may not be imposed under normal conditions,
but military legislation does contain certain such provisions, but always
as an alternative punishment to deprivation of liberty.
Id. at 113.
63. Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/33/40 (1978).
64. Notification of Withdrawal of Certain Reservations and Declarations, [1982]
2 Y. B.tR. Comm. 430, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21Add.4 and 5.
65. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 13th Sess., 301st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.301 (1981). A brief account of the Norwegian debate on abolition is
presented in H. Rostad, The International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation and
the Death Penalty, 58 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL [R. INT'L. D. PtN.]
345 (1987). The author notes that the Norwegian government announced it was
abolishing the death penalty for wartime offenses on the same day that it declared
the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International. Id. at 348.
66. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at
123. Article 6, paragraph 5 provides that:
Pending the introduction of further legislation to give full effect to the
provisions of paragraph 5 of article 6, should a case arise which is not
covered by the provisions of existing law, the Government of Ireland will
have regard to its obligations under the Covenant in the exercise of its
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tion was inconsistent with the Covenant, but that its intention
was to comply with the provisions by use of executive power.
As in the case of Norway, the reservation is of little more than
theoretical interest, because Ireland has abolished the death
penalty de facto. Again, no states parties have ever raised
objections to Ireland's reservation.
The reservations by Norway and Ireland to article 6 of the
Covenant are minor in scope when compared with the far-
reaching U.S. reservation. They identify a specific paragraph of
article 6, in comparison with the U.S. reservation, which en-
compasses virtually the entire provision. Furthermore, the
reserving states point to specific domestic legislation with
which the Covenant may be incompatible. In other words, they
indicate to their treaty partners that their legislation is not yet
fully in line with the Covenant and, implicitly at least, suggest
this inconsistency will change. Therefore, the existence of these
two other reservations to specific paragraphs of article 6, with-
out objection from other states parties to the Covenant, can
hardly be considered a precedent favorable to the United
States. Furthermore, the absence of other reservations to arti-
cles 6 and 7, with these two relatively minor exceptions, sup-
ports the view that states parties consider broad reservations
to the provisions to be inadmissible.
An argument can be made that all of the Covenant's sub-
stantive provisions are essential to its "object and purpose,"
and that, as a consequence, reservation to any such provision
is illegal. When the ICJ outlined the "object and purpose test"
in the Genocide Reference, ' the reservations that had pro-
voked the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion
concerned the competence of the ICJ to consider interstate
complaints of violation of the Convention,68 rather than the
power to advise commutation of the sentence of death.
67. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
68. Genocide Convention, supra note 15, art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S at 282. This is
the provision under which Bosnia and Herzegovina seized the International Court
of Justice, and under which provisional measures were ordered by the court. Case
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)),
1993 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8); Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13).
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norms prohibiting genocide. In other words, procedural and
non-substantive provisions of the instrument were at issue,
and the Court was clear in noting that each individual case
would have to be determined on its merits. 9 The Covenant
has several such non-substantive provisions, and reservation to
these may be considered less controversial.
However, if the fundamental purpose of the Covenant is
"recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and in-
alienable rights of all members of the human family,"7" then
how can a reservation be accepted to any of these rights? This
rather extreme view was expressed by Judge Jan De Meyer of
the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) in his
individual concurring opinion in Belilos v. Switzerland.71 "It
may even be thought that such reservations, and the provi-
sions permitting them, are incompatible with the jus cogens
and therefore null and void, unless they relate only to arrange-
ments for implementation, without impairing the actual sub-
stance of the rights in question." 2 Without entering into the
debate on whether such norms actually constitute jus cogens,
the comment by Judge De Meyer emphasizes their importance.
Judge De Meyer suggested that states parties might be al-
lowed "a brief spree" after ratifying in order to bring their
legislation into line and that reservation could be tolerated
solely for this purpose.73
Nevertheless, state practice generally indicates that reser-
vations to substantive provisions of human rights treaties in
general, and the Covenant in particular, are not in and of
themselves incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty. A large number of such reservations have been made to
various international human rights instruments, without any
opposition, based on the notion that these are prima facie
unacceptable. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
recognized that reservations to substantive provisions of hu-
man rights treaties cannot be excluded.74 The Committee has
69. See 1993 I.C.J. 3; 1993 I.C.J. 325.
70. The phrase is taken from the first preambular paragraph, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 172.
71. Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
72. Id. at 36.
73. Id.
74. Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Conven-
tion on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion 0C-3/83, 3 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
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reached the same result in its 1994 General Comment on res-
ervations. 5
The question becomes whether the same can, be affirmed
for the non-derogable provisions, that is, whether the fact that
the drafters of an international human rights treaty have
deemed that certain rights are so fundamental that they can
never be suspended. Within the substantive provisions of the
Covenant, a relatively small number of provisions are classi-
fied as non-derogable provisions-rights so fundamental and so
essential that they brook no exception, even in emergency
situations. 6 Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant belong to this
category."
Reservations to the non-derogable provisions of the Cove-
nant are very uncommon. The Congo made a reservation to
article 11-imprisonment for debt-citing its domestic law
which provided for the possibility of detention when an individ-
ual was in default on financial obligations." Belgium and the
Netherlands objected to this reservation, not because they
considered the legislation in question to be actually contrary to
article 11, but because they did not want to set a precedent by
which reservations to non-derogable articles might be tolerat-
ed. " When the United Kingdom reserved application of article
11, with respect to Jersey, there were no objections."0 Nor has
there been any objection to the interpretative declarations of
at 83 (1983).
75. General Comment No. 24 (52) relating to Reservations, U.N. GAOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg. 3, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.lAdd.6 (1994),
reprinted in 15 HUI. RTS. L. J. 464 [hereinafter General Comment]; see also Hum.
Rts. Comm. Concludes Consideration of U.S. Initial Report, supra note 37, at 2
(remarks of Human Rights Committee Chairman Francisco Jos6 Aguilar Urbina).
76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 4,
999 U.N.T.S. at 174; see Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State
Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 73-91 (Louis Henkin ed.,
1981).
77. At least one scholar has argued that article 6 constitutes a norm of jus
cogens. W. Paul Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability:
Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
120, 125-159 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985); Questions of Human Rights in Chile,
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 39th Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/1983/9 (1983).
78. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at
119.
79. Id. at 127-28.
80. Id. at 125, 127-30.
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Italys" and Argentina 2 to article 15, dealing with the non-
retroactivity of criminal law, or to that of Mexico83 to article
18, concerning the protection of religious freedom. In its objec-
tion to the U.S. reservation to article 7, the Netherlands de-
clared that "this reservation has the same effect as a general
derogation from this Article, while according to Article 4 of the
Covenant, no derogations, not even in times of public emergen-
cy, are permitted."'
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-Ameri-
can Court) has taken the position that reservations to non-
derogable provisions are not a priori unacceptable, although it
affirms that blanket reservations to the right to life are incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the Convention.85 Ac-
cording to the Court, reservations seeking only to restrict cer-
tain aspects of a non-derogable right cannot be presumed to be
invalid, providing they do not deprive the right of its basic
purpose."
The Human Rights Committee took a similar view in its
General Comment on reservations. 7 It noted that not all
rights of profound importance are deemed non-derogable, citing
in this respect article 9, respecting .the protection of persons
detained or arrested, and article 27, dealing with minority
rights.' Some rights have been made non-derogable, suggests
the Committee, merely because their suspension is irrelevant
to the legitimate control of national emergency by the state.89
An example is imprisonment for debt, prohibited by article 11
of the Covenant. In other cases, the Committee stated that
derogation is forbidden because it is impossible to control. An
example is article 18 dealing with the freedom of conscience.9'
81. Id. at 127.
82. Id. at 124.
83. Id. at 128.
84. MULTilATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, STA-
TUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at 129. Similar statements were made by
Denmark, Norway, and Finland. Id. at 127, 129.
85. See Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Con-
vention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, 3 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 83 (1983).
86. Id.




91. Id. This is a curious comment by the Committee because if the state can-
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The Committee concluded that "[w]hile there is no automatic
correlation between reservations to non-derogable provisions,
and reservations which offend against the object and purpose
of the Covenant, a State has a heavy onus to justify such a
reservation." 2 However, at least two members of the Commit-
tee, Fausto Pocar and Prafulla Chandra Natwarlal Bhagwata,
still appear favorable to the thesis that reservations directed
against non-derogable rights under the Covenant are question-
able.93
The Committee suggested another test to assist in estab-
lishing whether a reservation is compatible with the
Covenant's "object and purpose." In its General Comment, the
Committee declared that provisions in the Covenant that are
also norms of customary international law may not be the
subject of reservations.94
Accordingly, a State may not reserve the right to engage in
slavery, to torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive
persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain per-
sons, to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to
presume a person guilty unless he proves his innocence, to
execute pregnant women or children, to permit the advocacy
of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of
marriageable age the right to marry, or to deny to minorities
the right to enjoy their own culture, profess their own reli-
gion or use their own language. And while reservations to
particular clauses of Article 14 may be acceptable, a general
reservation to a fair trial would not be."
The General Comment implies that the U.S. reservation to
article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant, with respect to the
execution of individuals for crimes committed while under the
not limit freedom of conscience, then why bother including it in the Covenant at
all.
92. General Comment, supra note 75, 10.
93. Hum. Rts. Comm. Concludes Consideration of U.S. Initial Report, supra
note 37, at 3, 8.
94. General Comment, supra note 75, 8.
95. Id. However, in the past, the Committee has given effect to reservations
or interpretative declarations concerning provisions that are almost certainly de-
claratory of customary norms. Report of the Human Rights Committee: Communica-
tion No. 228/1987, C.L.D. v. France, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 252,
U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988).
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age of eighteen, is illegal because it violates a customary norm.
The General Comment could have been more explicit, for it
refers only to a prohibition "to execute pregnant women or
children," whereas article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant
speaks of "crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age."' The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
has already held that there is a customary norm prohibiting
execution of children, but that the norm only extends to some
unspecified age which is lower than eighteen. 7 The Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child defines a "child" as a person
under eighteen."
B. Interpreting the Covenant Provisions on the Death Penalty
Article 6 of the Covenant is quite unique in its formula-
tion. In the first paragraph, it states the right to life in general
terms and then devotes four of the remaining five paragraphs
to circumscribing the principal exception to that right, the
death penalty.9 Various sources assist in interpreting article
6, including the travaux prdparatoires,"' the initial and peri-
odic reports of states parties pursuant to article 40 of the Cove-
nant,'' the "caselaw" of the Committee under the Optional
96. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
97. Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser. IV/VJI.71, doc. 9 rev.1 (1987);
see also Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647: Application of Death Penalty on Juveniles
in the U.S. Violation of Human Rights Obligation Within the Inter-American Sys-
tem, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 355 (1987) (reported and accompanied with Note by Dinah
Shelton); Dinah Shelton, The Prohibition of Juvenile Executions in International
Law, 58 REV. INTL. D. PPN. 773 (1987); David Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile
Offenders by the United States Violates International Human Rights Law, 3 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POLY 339 (1988); but see Christina M. Cerna, U.S. Death Penalty
Tested before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 10 NETH. Q. HUM.
RTS. 155, 162 (1992) (reply to Professor Weissbrodt's criticism of the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission's report by a lawyer for the Commission).
98. Report of the Third Committee on Agenda Item 108, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 108, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989).
99. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
100. See Marc J. Bossuyt, The Death Penalty in the ZTravaux Priparatoires, of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in ESSAIS SUR LE CON-
CEPT DE "DRO1T DE VIVRE" [ESSAYS ON THE CONCEPT OF A RIGHT TO LIVE] 251
(Daniel Prgmont ed., 1988); see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-93 (1993).
101. See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 328-46 (1991); see also Dana D. Fischer, Reporting Under the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: The First Five Years of the Human Rights Committee,
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Protocol," 2 and scholarly writings." 3 These sources leave no
doubt that the principal purpose of article 6 is protection of the
individual against the intentional taking of life, of which the
death penalty is a paramount manifestation. Furthermore, the
thrust of article 6 is towards abolition of capital punishment,
as paragraphs (2) and (6) indicate. The right to life provision in
the Covenant is derived, of course, from article 3 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration)."4 Article 3
states the right to life without any qualification or limitation:
'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the per-
son."'0 5 Unlike many other provisions of the Declaration, such
as the right to a fair trial or the right to property, article 3 was
not simply borrowed from human rights provisions in domestic
constitutions. There were, to be sure, texts in national laws
which ensured the right to life, except in the execution of a
capital sentence. The classic example is the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that the right to life
may not be breached without due process of law.0 6 The draft-
ers of the Declaration sought to do much more, creating a new
right, one not previously recognized in domestic legislation.
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1982); Jose L. Gomez del Prado, United Nations Conven-
tions on Human Rights: the Practice of the Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Dealing with Reporting
Obligations of States Parties, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 492 (1985); Farrokh Jhabvala, The
Practice of the Covenant's Human Rights Committee, 1976-82: Review of State Par-
ty Reports, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 81, 95-106 (1984).
102. See P.R. Ghandhi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Indi-
vidual Communication, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 201 (1986); Jakob M61ller, Recent
Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee: A Brief Overview, 1992 CAN.
H.R.Y.B. 79; Avv. Fausto Pocar, Legal Value of the Human Rights Committee's
Views, 1992 CAN. H!M.YB. 119; B.G. Ramcharan, The Emerging Jurisprudence of
the Human Rights Committee, 6 DALHOUSIE L.J. 7, 33-40 (1980); Markus Schmidt,
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Procedure and Practice, 4 INTERIGHTS BULL. 27 (1989); A. de Zayas et al., Applica-
tion by the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights Under the Optional Protocol, 1986 CAN. H.R.Y.B. 101; Ton J.M.
Zuijdwijk, The Right to Petition the United Nations Because of Alleged Violations of
Human Rights, 59 CAN. BAR REV. 103 (1981).
103. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 114, 114-137; MCGOLDRICK, supra note 101; SCHABAS,
supra note 100.
104. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (I)(A), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 72, U.N. Doe. A1810 (1948).
105. Id.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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During the debate in the Third Committee in the autumn
of 1948 on article 3 of the Declaration, discussion focussed on
the abolition of capital punishment."° An amendment that
would have made article 3 explicitly abolitionist did not suc-
ceed,' as this was considered to be premature and many
states were not yet ready for such a step. Nevertheless, the
travaux prdparatoires of the Declaration indicate that a central
object and purpose of the right to life provision is the limita-
tion of the death penalty, with a view to its abolition. 9 Sub-
sequent interpretation of article 3 of the Declaration by the
United Nations General Assembly confirms that it is a provi-
sion dealing in large measure with the limitation and eventual
abolition of the death penalty."0
The drafters of the Covenant intended to promulgate bind-
ing norms that would give effect to the "common standard of
achievement" set out in the Declaration. In keeping with the
general purpose of the right to life provision as expressed in
the Declaration, the Covenant's drafters provided a more ex-
plicit definition of the limitations on the death penalty. It was
not to be imposed arbitrarily, or upon pregnant women, or for
juvenile offenses, and only for the most serious of crimes. The
goal of abolition was implied in the opening words of para-
graph 2: "In countries which have not abolished the death
penalty .... ." In order to clarify the "general purpose" of the,
107. See Lilly E. Landerer, Capital Punishment as a Human Rights Issue Be.
fore the United Nations, 4 HUM. RTS. J. 511, 516-18 (1971); ALBERT VERDOoDT,
NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA D9CLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE
L'HOmME 95-100 (1964); SCHABAS, supra note 100, at 30-45.
108. Draft International Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
3d Sess., U.N. Doe. ANO.3/265 (1948).
109. SCHABAS, supra note 100, at 25-50.
110. See Capital Punishment, GA. Res. 2393 (XXII), U.N. GAOR 3d. Comm.,
23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). In a later resolution, the
General Assembly:
[alffirm[ed] that, in order fully to guarantee the right to life, provided for
in article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the main
objective to be pursued is that of progressively restricting the number of
offenses for which capital punishment may be imposed, with a view to
the desirability of abolishing this punishment in all countries.
Capital Punishment, GA. Res. 2857 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29,
3, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1972).
111. The Working Party of the Third Committee stated that "[w]ith reference
to the text of paragraph 2 proposed by the working party, it was interesting to
note that the expression 'in countries which have not abolished the death penalty'
was intended to show the direction in which the drafters of the Covenant hoped
[Vol. MX.:2298
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right to life, the drafters added paragraph 6, which contem-
plates the eventual abolition of the death penalty, stating that
"[niothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent
the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the
present Covenant.""' Paragraph 6 is not in fact a normative
provision at all, but rather a statement of intentions, and, as
such, is really more preambular in nature. The drafters of
article 6 provided explicit clues to its general purpose within
the text itself.
Therefore, the travaux prdparatoires indicate that the
general purpose of article 6 of the Covenant is the limitation of
the death penalty, with a view to its eventual abolition. This
conclusion is strengthened by state practice under the Cove-
nant. Many of the initial and periodic reports of states parties
to the Covenant, required pursuant to article 40, thoroughly
review the limitation and abolition of the death penalty in
their discussion of compliance with article 6. Typically, during
presentation of their periodic reports, states parties are closely
questioned about capital punishment, and members of the
Committee often urge them to limit further and eventually
abolish the death penalty. That death penalty issues are cen-
tral to the general purpose of article 6 is also apparent from its
importance in the first General Comment on the provision
issued by the Committee."'
that the situation would develop." Draft International Covenants on Human Rights,
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 12th Sess., 816th mtg., Agenda Item 33, a 19, at 271,
273, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.816 (1957).
112. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
113. General Comment 6 (16) of Article 6, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th
Sess., 378th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21Add.1 (1982). A second comment on
the right to life deals with issues of war and nuclear weapons. General Comment
14 (23) of Article 6, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 14th Sess., Annex V1, Supp.
No. 40, at 162, U.N. Doc. A140/40 (1985). During the drafting of General Comment
6 (16), some members of the Committee felt it important to stress the need to
eliminate the social and economic conditions that lead to crime as preliminary to
the abolition of capital punishment, but no amendment in this sense was ever
made. See U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th Sess., 369th mtg. 22, 24, & 29,
at 2, 6-7, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/SR.369 (1982); see also General Comment 6 (15), U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th Sess., 370th mtg. 99 19 & 29, at 2, 6, 8, U.N.
Doc. CCPRIC/SR.370 (1982). In the Third Committee, at the thirty-seventh session
of the General Assembly, there was widespread satisfaction with General Comment
6 (16). One of the few critical voices came from the German Democratic Republic,
which felt that describing the abolition of the death penalty as being desirable
was inappropriate, because states had a duty laid down in article 6 that went
well beyond the merely desirable. Torture and Other Cruet, Inhuman or Degrading
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Some have gone a step further, arguing that article 7 of
the Covenant, dealing with torture or cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment, rules out the death penalty.
Such a position was advanced, in the context of comparable
provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights (Eu-
ropean Convention), by Judge Jan de Meyer in the Soering
case."4 However, Judge de Meyer was the only member of
the European Court prepared to give the European Convention
such a radically dynamic interpretation."5 All of the other
judges took the view that because the European Convention
explicitly recognized the death penalty as an exception or limi-
tation to its right to life provision, and because the states par-
ties had also prepared an additional, as opposed to an "amend-
ing," protocol whose sole purpose was to neutralize that anach-
ronistic provision,"' article 3 could not be construed in an
abolitionist sense."7 However, article 3 of the European Con-
vention, which is comparable to article 7 of the Covenant, was
held by the European Court to apply to the death penalty with-
in the context of the "death row phenomenon," a term which
describes the lengthy incarceration under gruesome conditions
of individuals awaiting execution."'
The Committee, in its interpretations of article 7 of the
Covenant, has been very reluctant to follow the example of the
European Court."' In its decision in a Jamaican death row
case, the Committee stated that "prolonged judicial proceed-
ings do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, even if they may be a source of mental strain and
tension for detained persons."12 ° This oft-cited precedent of
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 37th Sess., 52d mtg., Agenda
Item 88, 4, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/C.3137/SR.52 (1982).
114. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51 (1989).
115. Id.
116. See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, April
28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114.
117. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. Ha. (ser. A).
118. Id. at 99.
119. Issues respecting prisoner treatment on death row may also arise under
article 10 of the Covenant, to which the United States has made no reservation.
See Report of the Human Rights Committee: Communication No. 24011987, Collins
v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 227, U.N. Doc. A/47/40
(1992); see also Report of the Human Rights Committee: Communication No.
23211987, Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
74, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990).
120. Report of the Human Rights Committee: Communication Nos. 270/1988
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the Committee has been frequently challenged, 2' and it ap-
pears that the Committee is now modifying its view of the
"death row phenomenon," so as to harmonize it with the case
law of the European Court122 and the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council.'" In its views in the matter of Cox v. Can-
ada, published in December 1994, the Committee suggests that
remedies against the death penalty be provided within a rea-
sonable time.' 4 An evolution in the Committee's approach is
also implied in the individual opinions of Kurt Herndl and
Waleed Sadi'" and the opinion of Bertil Wennergren.'26
This tendency is confirmed by the Committee's recent com-
ments on the initial report of the United States, which express
its concern with "the long stay on death row which, in specific
instances, may amount to a breach of article 7 of the Cove-
nant."
127
The Committee has, of course, recognized "that the obliga-
tion to treat individuals deprived of their liberty with respect
for the inherent dignity of the human person encompasses
[questions such as] the provision of adequate medical care
during detention, and that this obligation, obviously, extends
to persons under the sentence of death."'" The Committee
has also recognized that article 7 applies to the technique of
and 271/1988, Barrett v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 250-
51, U.N. Doc. A147/40 (1992); see also Report of the Human Rights Committee:
Communication No. 25011987, Reid v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 92, U.N. Doc. A145/40 (1990) (in which the Committee said such allegations
were insufficiently substantiated); Report of the Human Rights Committee: Commu-
nication Nos. 210/1986 and 225/1987, Morgan v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 230, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989).
121. See the views of Christine Chanet in Communication Nos. 270/1988 and
271/1988, supra note 120.
122. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 99 (1989).
123. Pratt v. Attorney Gen., 4 All. E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from
Jamaica).
124. See Extradition to the United States to Face the Possible Imposition of the
Death Penalty not Considered to Violate the CCPR/Cox v. Canada, 15 HUM. RTS.
L. J. 410, 417 (1994).
125. Id. at 418-19.
126. Id. at 421.
127. Consideration of Reports, supra note 6, 5 16, at 4; see also Hum. Rts.
Comm. Concludes Consideration of U.S. Initial Report, supra note 37, at 4, 8 (re-
marks of Committee members Andreas Mavromattis and Prafullachandra
Natwarlal Bhagwati during presentation of the initial report of the United States).
128. Communication No. 232/1987, Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, supra note
119, 12.7, at 74.
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execution. In its General Comment on article 7, the Committee
noted that "when the death penalty is applied by a State party
for the most serious crimes, it must not only be strictly limited
in accordance with article 6 but it must be carried out in such
a way as to cause the least possible physical and mental suf-
fering."129 In 1993, the Committee condemned California's use
of the gas chamber as constituting a violation of article 7 of the
Covenant."'
C. Reservations to death penalty provisions in other interna-
tional instruments
A review of reservations to the death penalty provisions in
other international instruments may be of some assistance in
assessing the legality of the U.S. reservations. These sources
confirm that the U.S. reservations are an extraordinary depar-
ture from current practice, which, while permitting reserva-
tions to provisions dealing with the death penalty, confines
their scope to the strict necessities of the situation.
There have been no reservations to the capital punishment
provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights."'
There have been three reservations concerning the death pen-
alty to article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights
(American Convention)' by Barbados, Guatemala, and Trin-
129. General Comments Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article
40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights: Gen-
eral Comment 20 (44), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., J 6, at 2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1JAdd.3 (1992). The Committee also took the occasion to reit-
erate that article 6 of the Covenant refers generally to abolition of the death pen-
alty in terms that strongly suggest that abolition is desirable. Id.
130. See Communication No. 469/1991, supra note 8.
131. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 29, art. 2, 9 1, 213
U.N.T.S. at 224. The right to life is set out generally in article 2. Id. Malta has
made a reservation to article 2, paragraph 2, to the effect that the right to self-
defense also includes defense of property. Id. The reservation provides that:
The Government of Malta, having regard to article 64 of the Convention,
declares that the principle of lawful defence admitted under sub-para-
graph (a) of paragraph (2) of Article 2 of the Convention shall apply in
Malta also to the defence of property to the extent required by the provi-
sions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 238 of the Criminal Code of
Malta.
Convention for The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 590 U.N.T.S. 300 (ratification by Malta). A similar reservation by Liech-
tenstein was made at the time of ratification, but it was withdrawn a decade
later. Council of Europe, Doc. HIINF (91) 2, INFO. SHEET No. 28, Nov. 7, 1990-
Apr. 1991, at 1.
132. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 41, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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idad and Tobago. Article 4 of the American Convention was
modelled on article 6 of the Covenant, which it closely resem-
bles. When Barbados ratified the Convention in 1982, it made
a reservation to article 4, paragraph 4, noting that, under its
criminal law, treason was punishable by death, although the
whole matter of the death penalty was under review.13 A
second reservation to article 4, paragraph 5, stated that while
youth or old age may be factors to be considered by the Privy
Council in deciding whether the death penalty should be car-
ried out, Barbadian legislation allowed the execution of per-
sons over sixteen and set no upper age limit."M There have
been no objections to this reservation.
Guatemala's reservation to article 4, paragraph 4, which
excludes the death penalty for political crimes," has been
Reservations to the American Convention are permitted under article 75, "in con-
formity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
signed on May 23, 1969". Id. at 161.
133. Barbados' reservation stated that:
In respect of 4(4) the criminal code of Barbados provides for death by
hanging as a penalty for murder and treason. The Government is at
present reviewing the whole matter of the death penalty which is only
rarely inflicted but wishes to enter a reservation on this point in as
much as treason in certain circumstances might be regarded as a politi-
cal offence and falling within the terms of section 4(4).
American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos, Costa Rica," Nov. 22,
1969, 1298 U.N.T.S. 441 (ratification by Barbados). Barbados also made a reserva-
tion to article 4, paragraph 5, which provided that:
In respect of 4(5) while the youth or old age of an offender may be mat-
ters which the Privy Council, the highest Court of Appeal, might take
into account in considering whether the sentence of death should be
carried out, persons of 16 years and over or over 70 years of age may be
executed under Barbadian law.
134. Id. No similar reservation was made by Barbados when it ratified the
Covenant, which has an identical provision.
In 1982, Martin Marsh, who was convicted of murder committed while sev-
enteen years of age, was executed by Barbados. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN
THE STATE KILIS ... : THE DEATH PENALTY: A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 106-07
(1989). There have been no executions in Barbados since 1984. Id.
135. The reservation states that:
The Government of the Republic of Guatemala ratifies the American
Convention on Human Rights, signed at San Jos6, Costa Rica, on Novem-
ber 22, 1969, with a reservation as to article 4, paragraph 4, thereof,
since the Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, in its article 54,
only excludes the application of the death penalty to political crimes, but
not to common crimes related to political crimes.
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 41, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 210.
Article 4, paragraph 4 states that "[i]n no case shall capital punishment be inflict-
ed for political offenses or related common crimes." Id. at 145.
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the subject of an advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court.
The issue arose after four politically-related death sentences
were handed down in Guatemala and the matter was submit-
ted to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.
136
The four convicts were eventually executed by firing squad,
having been sentenced by "Courts of Special Jurisdiction."
137
The Inter-American Court found the reservation to be legal but
inadequate in scope and concluded that it was ineffective to
block application of article 4, paragraph 2 of the American
Convention.3 ' The reservation was withdrawn on August 12,
1986. 39
Trinidad and Tobago ratified the American Convention,
with a reservation noting that its laws do not prohibit execu-
tion of a person over age seventy.4 ' There have been no ob-
jections. The reservations by Barbados and Trinidad and Toba-
go are similar to those made by Ireland and Norway to article
6 of the Covenant,' 4' in that they attempt to account for ex-
isting legislation not in line with the international obligations
being undertaken, and are not aimed at preserving a state's
freedom to maneuver on the question in the future.
The United States participated fully in the drafting of the
American Convention. At the final drafting conference in 1969,
it urged deletion of the "political offense" exception, suggesting
that this might benefit the assassin of a president.' At the
136. Case 8094, Inter-Am. C.I.R. 176, OEA/ser. L/V/fI.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1993);
Case 9038, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 176, OEA/ser. L/VII.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1993).
137. Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Conven-
tion on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion 0C-3/83, 3 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 83 (1983).
138. Id. at 90.
139. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERI-
CAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1985-1986, at 158, OEA/ser. IJV/II.68, doc. 8
rev. 1 (1986).
140. "As regards Article 4(5) of the Convention the Government of The Repub-
lic of Trinidad and Tobago makes a reservation in that under the laws of Trinidad
and Tobago there is no prohibition against the carrying out a sentence of death on
a person over seventy (70) years of age." American Convention on Human Rights:
"Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," registered Jan. 4, 1994, Registration No. 17955.
141. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, 999
U.N.T.S. at 297; MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note
2, at 121, 123.
142. ORGANIZATION OF AfERICAN STATES, OBSERVATION OF THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE DRAFT INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON




same time, it did not object to the "most serious crimes" provi-
sion. The United States 'also urged deletion of the prohibition
of juvenile executions, because "the proscription of capital
punishment within arbitrary age limits presents various diffi-
culties in law." However, the United States couched its pro-
posal in abolitionist terms, noting that such a provision weak-
ened the text, given "the general trend, already apparent, for
the gradual abolition of the death penalty."' The U.S. repre-
sentative subsequently withdrew this proposal.'
Death penalty provisions are also found in the third45
and fourth'46 Geneva Conventions, and in the two Additional
Protocols of 1977."47 Only the provision in the fourth Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians (fourth Ge-
neva Convention) has provoked reservations. Article 68, para-
graph 2 of that instrument states that the death penalty may
not be imposed in wartime on civilian populations by an occu-
pying power if it has previously been abolished in peace-
time.' Adoption of the provision at the diplomatic confer-
ence of 1949 was accompanied by identical reservations from
the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand,
Australia, and the Netherlands for the purpose of protecting
"... . the right to impose the death penalty in accordance with
the provisions of Article 68, paragraph 2, without regard to
143. Id.
144. O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. KXVI1.1, doc. 40, corr. 1 (1969). As evidence of its
rejection of the norm concerning execution of juveniles, the United States contend-
ed that the U.S. delegate, during drafting of the American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 41, 1143 U.N.T.S. at 145, pointed out that the United States
had problems with Article 4, paragraph 5's arbitrary age limit of eighteen which
conflicted with its federal structure. Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, 71, OEA/ser.
I/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
145. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, arts. 3(I)(d), 87, 100, 101, 107, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136-38, 202, 210-12, 216
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
146. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians, Aug. 12, 1949,
arts. 3(I)(d), 68, 74, 75, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288-90, 330, 334-36 (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950).
147. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Re-
lating to The Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June
8, 1977, art. 77, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to The
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977,
art. 6, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 613-14 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
148. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians, supra note 146,
75 U.N.T.S. at 330.
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whether the offenses referred to therein are punishable by
death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the
occupation begins."' Canada's reservation was not main-
tained at the time of ratification, 50 and those of the United
Kingdom and Australia were later withdrawn.' The Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross does not consider the
reservations to article 68 to be "incompatible with the aims
and objects of the [fourth Geneva] Convention."5 2 It should
also be noted that at the time of ratification, the United States
made no reservation to article 68 of the fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, which prohibits execution of protected persons in occupied
territories for offenses committed under the age of eigh-
teen. 53
The Convention on the Rights of the Child'TM contains a
provision that in effect repeats the prohibition on execution for
crimes committed by persons under the age of eighteen found
149. Pakistan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and Suriname made the same
reservation at the time of ratification of the fourth Geneva Convention. See Gene-
va Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 326, 314 U.N.T.S. 333, 334, 575 U.N.T.S. 285, 286, 1151
U.N.T.S. 390. Romania made an objection to the Korean reservation, stating it was
incompatible with the purpose of the fourth Geneva Convention. 609 U.N.T.S. 253.
In addition, Australia specified that it interpreted the term "military installations,"
as used in article 68, paragraph 2, to mean installations having a military interest
that were essential for the occupying power. 314 U.N.T.S. at 334.
150. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, done Aug. 12, 1949,
1965 Can. T.S. 20 (Canada's Instruments for Ratification deposited May 14, 1965).
151. The United Kingdom's reservation was withdrawn February 2, 1972. Gene-
va Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 811 U.N.T.S. 376; see also G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVEN-
TIONS 44 (1958). Australia's reservation was withdrawn February 21, 1974. Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 949 U.N.T.S. 310 (withdrawal of reservation).
152. Claude Pilloud, Reservations to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 181 INTWL
REV. RED CROSS 163, 185 (1976).
153. The United States delegate to the 1949 diplomatic conference, during first
reading of the provision in Committee II, said: "The abolition of the death penalty
in the case of protected persons under eighteen years of age (last paragraph) was
a matter which called for very careful consideration before such a sweeping provi-
sion was adopted." Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol.
HA, Berne: Federal Political Department, Summary record of nineteenth meeting
of Committee II, 673.
154. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
1448. "No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment ...
shall be imposed for offenses committed by persons below 18 years of age." Id.
37(a).
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in article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant, article 4, paragraph
5 of the American Convention, and article 68, paragraph 4 of
the fourth Geneva Convention. Myanmar is the only state to
have made a reservation to this provision.'55 The reservation
does not even seem to be aimed at the issue of the death pen-
alty, but rather at the subject of juvenile justice systems in
general. Myanmar's reservation inspired three objections, from
Germany, Ireland and Portugal, 5 ' and it has subsequently
155. The reservation towards article 37 provides that:
The Union of Myanmar accepts in principle the provisions of arti-
cle 37 as they are in consonance with its laws, rules, regulations, proce-
dures and practice as well as with its traditional, cultural and religious
values. However, having regard to the exigencies of the situation obtain-
ing in the country as present, the Union of Myanmar states as follows:
1. Nothing contained in Article 37 shall prevent, or be construed
as preventing, the Government of the Union of Myanmar from assuming
or exercising, in conformity with the laws for the time being in force in
the country and the procedures established thereunder, such powers as
are required by the exigencies of the situation for the preservation and
strengthening of the rule of law, the maintenance of public order (ordre
public) and, in particular, the protection of the supreme national interest,
namely, the non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of
national solidarity and the perpetuation of national sovereignty, which
constitute the paramount national causes of the Union of Myanmar.
2. Such powers shall include the powers of arrest, detention, im-
prisonment, exclusion, interrogation, enquiry and investigation.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at 202.
156. Germany:
The Federal Republic of Germany considers that the reservations
made by the Union of Myanmar concerning articles 15 and 37 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child are incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Convention (article 51, paragraph 2) and therefore
objects to them.
This objection shall not preclude the entry into force of the Con-
vention as between the Union of Myanmar and the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Id. at 200. Ireland's objection provides that:
The Government of Ireland considers that such reservations, which
seek to limit the responsibilities of the reserving State under the Conven-
tion, by invoking general principles of national law, may create doubts as
to the commitment of those States to the object and purpose of the Con-
vention.
This objection shall not constitute an obstacle to the entry into
force of the Convention between Ireland and the aforementioned States.
Id. Portugal's objection provides that:
The Government of Portugal considers that reservations by which
a State limits its responsibilities under the Convention by invoking gen-
eral principles of National law may create doubts on the commitments of
the reserving State to the object and purpose of the Convention and,
moreover, contribute to undermining the basis of International law. It is
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
been withdrawn.5 '
D. Articles 6 and 7 as the Crystallization of Emerging Norms
of Customary Law
At least some of the elements of articles 6 and 7 of the
Covenant represent a crystallization of emerging norms of
customary international law. A state cannot, in making a res-
ervation to a multilateral treaty, set aside its obligations under
customary norms. In its General Comment on reservations, the
Committee has affirmed that the prohibition of torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the exe-
cution of pregnant women or children, constitute customary
norms.
158
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights did not
agree to the existence of a norm of customary international law
establishing eighteen as the minimum age for imposition of the
death penalty, but concluded that such a norm was "emerg-
ing."159 In any case, it said that even if a customary norm did
exist, it would not bind a state which had protested the
norm. 6 ' Because the United States government had proposed
to ratify the American Convention with a reservation to article
4, paragraph 5 stating that the United States "reserves the
right in appropriate cases to subject minors to procedures and
penalties applicable to adults," the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights considered that it had protested the
norm.
161
in the common interest of States that treaties to which they have chosen
to become parties also are respected, as to object and purpose, by all
parties. The Government therefore objects to the reservations.
This objection shall not constitute an obstacle to the entry into
force of the Convention between Portugal and Myanmar.
Id. at 201.
157. Id. at 202.
158. General Comment, supra note 75, 9 8. However, in the past, the Human
Rights Committee has given effect to reservations or interpretative declarations
concerning provisions that are almost certainly declaratory of customary norms.
Report of the Human Rights Committee: Communication No. 22811987, C.L.D. v.
France, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, 9 3, at 252, U.N. Doc. A143/40
(1988).
159. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, 82, OEA/ser. LIV/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1
(1987).
160. See id. at 77.
161. See id. at 78.
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The ICJ has reviewed the customary nature of common
article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,162
which proscribes the carrying out of executions "without pre-
vious judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."'63 At the very least, com-
mon article 3 requires that the death penalty not be imposed
"arbitrarily," and without appropriate judicial guarantees. To
the extent that the United States reserves application of para-
graphs 1 and 2 of article 6 of the Covenant which, like common
article 3, prohibit "arbitrary" executions without due process, it
is an illegal attempt to set aside a customary norm, and one to
which the United States obviously cannot claim to have been a
persistent objector.'64 The same can be said of the prohibition
of torture, which makes up one of the "core" rights that are
often elevated to the status of norms of jus cogens.'65
As satisfying as the Human Rights Committee's conclusion
that juvenile executions violate a customary norm may be from
a humanitarian standpoint, this controversial affirmation is
not supported by any demonstration of either practice or opiio
juris. In our view, it is far from obvious that a prohibition on
juvenile executions constitutes a norm of customary law, as
this is generally defined.'66 The problem of such wishful
thinking among human rights jurists, who invoke ill-defined
"custom" as a substitute for serious and sometimes frustrating
efforts at treaty interpretation, is not a new one. Critical of
overly optimistic assessments of the scope of customary rules,
Theodor Meron has drawn attention to a "tendency to ignore,
for the most part, the availability of evidence of state practice
(scant as it may have been) and to assume that noble humani-
tarian principles that deserve recognition as the positive law of
162. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27).
163. Id. at 115.
164. See id.
165. This "core" right is elevated to the status of norms of jus cogens pursuant
to article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 34,
1155 U.N.T.S. at 344. Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as
Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AM1. J. INTL L. 946 (1967).
166. William A. Schabas, The Death Penalty for Crimes Committed by Persons
Under Eighteen Years of Age, in MONITORING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, (E. Verhellen
ed., forthcoming 1995).
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the international community have in fact been recognized as
such by states. The 'ought' merges with the 'is,' the lex ferenda
with the lex lata."'67
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE UNITED STATES
RESERVATION
International law recognizes the right of states parties to a
multilateral treaty to formulate objections to reservations. This
right amounts to a technique for establishing the admissibility
of reservations, but it only operates on a bilateral basis. It sug-
gests that the matter of the legality of reservations is entrust-
ed solely to the states parties. Some international treaties have
provided a mechanism for the determination of the legality or
illegality of reservations. For example, the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion states that a reservation will be deemed incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty if at least two-thirds of
states parties object to the reservation."'
A. Objections by States Parties
The U.S. reservations to articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant
were answered with objections from eleven European states
parties.'69 Sweden was the first, timing its objection to coin-
cide with the World Conference on Human Rights, in June
1993, for publicity reasons. 17 These reservations are worded
in similar terms and suggest a considerable degree of coopera-
tion.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, states parties have a period of twelve months in which to
object to a reservation.'' If a party objects, then it is not
bound by the reserved provision, at least with respect to its
obligations vis-a-vis the reserving state.' The technique of
167. Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 Adf. J.
INTL L. 348, 361 (1987).
168. International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 41, art. 20, 2, 660 U.N.T.S. at 236.
169. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2.
170. Id.
171. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 34, art. 20, % 5,




objections was developed in the context of multilateral treaties
not concerned with human rights and is aimed at preserving
the reciprocity of obligations between contracting states. Suit-
able as this mechanism may be in the case of some multilater-
al treaties, its significance is very slight when human rights
instruments are concerned. As the European Court has ob-
served on at least two occasions, reciprocity is a concept that
does not fully apply to human rights treaties.73 By their na-
ture, human rights stipulations in international conventions
create obligations for a state party in favor of individuals. It
would be absurd to conclude that the objections by Sweden and
other European states to the U.S. reservations on the death
penalty discharge them from complying with articles 6 and 7 to
the extent that they concern the United States, and this was
surely not their intention in formulating such objections.' 4
Support for this position is also found in the caselaw of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Although there had
been no objections to Guatemala's reservation to article 4,
paragraph 4 of the American Convention, the absence of objec-
tions did not prevent either the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights or the Inter-American Court from examining
the matter. Another advisory opinion of the Inter-American
Court, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of
the American Convention (articles 74 and 75), also speaks to
this point.15 The Court noted that the principles dealing with
reservation and objection found in the Vienna Convention:
reflect the needs of traditional multilateral international
instruments which have as their object the reciprocal ex-
change, for the mutual benefit of the States Parties, of bar-
gained for rights and obligations.... It permits States to
ratify many multilateral treaties and to do so with the reser-
vations they deem necessary; it enables the other contracting
States to accept or reject the reservations and to determine
whether they wish to enter into treaty relations with the
reserving States; and it provides that as soon as at least one
173. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 90 (1978); Belilos
v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) (1988).
174. linbert, Les reserves, les ddrogations, supra note 42, at 46.
175. The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Con-
vention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion 0C-282, 2 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1982).
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other State Party has accepted the reservation, the treaty
enters into force with respect to the reserving State.
The Court must emphasize, however, that modem hu-
man rights treaties in general, and the American Convention
in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional
type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange or
rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their
object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of
individual human beings.176
These words echo similar comments in an early report
from the European Commission on Human Rights (European
Commission):
the obligations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties
in the Convention are essentially of an objective character,
being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of
individual human beings from infringements by any of the
High Contracting Parties than to create subjective and recip-
rocal rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves.177
When France lodged an interstate application against
Turkey alleging a breach of article 15 of the European Conven-
tion, Turkey complained that France had itself filed a reserva-
tion to article 15, and was therefore barred from blaming Tur-
key.78 The European Commission dismissed the argument,
noting the "objective character of the [European] Conven-
tion., ,79
In Belilos v. Switzerland, the Swiss government objected
that the European Court was foreclosed from considering the
illegality of its reservation because there had been no objection
by other states parties or by the depository.180 The European
Court replied laconically: "the silence of the depository and the
176. Id. at 15-16.
177. Austria v. Italy, App. No. 788/60, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 116, 140
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R.); see also Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 8007/77, 1978 YB.
Eur. Cony. on H.R. 226 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
178. France v. Turkey, App. No. 9940/82, 1983 YB. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 1 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.).
179. Id.
180. Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). It had hinted at
the same argument in Temeltasch v. Switzerland, App. No. 9116/80, 31 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 138 (1983); see also GRARD COHEN-JONATHAN, LA CON-
VENTION EUROPtENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 87-88 (1990).
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Contracting States does not deprive the [European] Convention
institutions of the power to make their own assessment." 8'
The Committee has also taken this position in its recent
General Comment on reservations. The Committee states that
the objections mechanism of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) is "inappropriate" to
human rights treaties:
[H]uman rights treaties... and the Covenant specifically,
are not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations.
They concern the endowment of individuals with rights. The
principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place, save perhaps
in the limited context of reservations to declarations on the
Committee's competence under article 41. And because the
operation of the classic rules on reservations is so inadequate
for the Covenant, States have often not seen any legal inter-
est in or need to object to reservations. The absence of protest
by States cannot imply that a reservation is either compati-
ble or incompatible with the object and purpose of the Cove-
nant. Objections have been occasional, made by some States
but not others, and on grounds not always specified; when an
objection is made, it often does not specify a legal conse-
quence, or sometimes even indicates that the objecting party
nonetheless does not regard the Covenant as not in effect as
between the parties concerned. In short, the pattern is so
unclear that it is not safe to assume that a non-objecting
State thinks that a particular reservation is acceptable. In
the view of the Committee, because of the special characteris-
tics of the Covenant as a human rights treaty, it is open to
question what effect objections have between States inter
se. 
182
Though they should not operate in the manner envisaged
by the Vienna Convention, objections may still serve a useful
purpose in treaty interpretation. To this effect, in its March 23,
1995 judgment in Loizidou v. Turkey, the European Court
appears to breathe new life into the significance of objections
in the context of human rights treaties.8 ' The European
Court considered that objections "lend convincing support" to
arguments that a reserving state should have been well aware
181. Belilos, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23.
182. General Comment, supra note 75, 91 17, at 467.
183. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
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that a given reservation was dubious. 1 4
B. Adjudication of the Issue
The Covenant has no conventional provision for the adjudi-
cation of the legality of reservations. International law has
traditionally regarded this as a matter between states, but for
the reasons mentioned above, the logic of this view is under-
mined by the special nature of human rights treaties. Accord-
ing to the scholar Nguyen Quoc Dinh, when a human rights
treaty creates a control body for conventional obligations, such
a body should be entitled to determine the legality of reserva-
tions.'85 However, this view is not shared by all scholars, 86
and the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion has explicitly refused to assume this role.'87 The power
of the Strasbourg organs to rule on the legality of reservations
to the European Convention on Human Rights is now beyond
question."s
184. Id. J 95.
185. NGUYEN Quoc DINH ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 181 (5th ed.
1994). For a detailed discussion of this point, see Gdrard Cohen-Jonathan, Les
Reserves & la Convention europdenne des droits de l'homme (4 propos de l'arr~t
Belilos du 29 avril 1988), REV. GtN. D. INT'L PUB. 273, 279-86 (1989).
186. Imbert, Les reserves, les ddrogations, supra note 42, at 50 nn.4-5, 57 n.74.
187. See Report of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 85, 86, U.N. Doc. A/33/18 (1979); see also
Selected Legal Opinions of the Secretariat of the United Nations and Related Inter-
governmental Organizations, 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 159, 219-221, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.C/14, U.N. Sales No. E.84.I.1 (opinion of the Legal Office of the Unit-
ed Nations). This is explained by the fact that the International Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 41, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, provides expressly for a mechanism of determining the legality of reserva-
tions, something which is not present in the Covenant. Nevertheless, given that
the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
provides for individual petitions, should not an individual who files a communica-
tion be entitled to contest the legality of a reservation? See IMBERT, supra note 42,
at 125. During presentation of periodic reports, members of the Committee for the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women have questioned states parties about
their reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, supra note 35, 1249 U.N.T.S. 18. See e.g., CENTRE FOR
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHA/5,
U.N. Sales No. E.89.IV.4 (1989) (initial report of Egypt); Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 38, at 18, 53, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1990) (initial report of Ireland and
Belgium).
188. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Chorherr v.
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The Committee has made it clear, in its 1994 General
Comment on reservations, that it considers itself to be compe-
tent to address the legality of reservations.'89 It may do this
in the form of conclusions during the presentation of periodic
reports, or in its views issued pursuant to individual or inter-
state petitions. This follows upon a position adopted by the
chairpersons of the various treaty bodies, recommending "that
treaty bodies state clearly that certain reservations to interna-
tional human rights instruments are contrary to the object and
purpose of those instruments and consequently incompatible
with treaty law."9 ' This dynamic view is to be welcomed, as
the multitude of reservations not only to the Covenant but also
to other similar treaties has pushed human rights law into a
crisis. As shown, the traditional approach to the question, by
the technique of objections, is totally inappropriate. If an in-
strument creates a treaty body whose mission it is to study
and comment upon "the measures [states parties] have adopted
which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the
progress made in the enjoyment of those rights,"' then the
treaty body must inevitably examine just what norms actually
bind the state party. To do this, it must pronounce itself on the
validity of reservations. That is what the Committee has done,
and not a minute too soon.
The new chairperson of the Committee, Francisco Jos6
Aguilar Urbina, pointed out to the U.S. delegation during the
presentation of its initial report, in March 1995, that "[wihile
the general comment did not suggest that the Committee's
interpretations were binding; the Committee hoped they would
be given careful consideration by State parties."'92 Of course,
on a strict reading of the Covenant, nothing that the Commit-
tee says is really "binding" upon states parties. States that
Austria, 266 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1993); Weber v. Switzerland, 177 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser-A) at 5 (1990); Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988);
Temeltasch v. Switzerland, App. No. 9116/80, 31 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
138 (1983).
189. General Comment, supra note 75.
190. See e.g., Effectiue Implementation of International Instruments on Human
Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human
Rights, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 100, 9 30, U.N. Doec. A149/537 (1994).
191. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 40,
999 U.N.T.S. at 181.
192. Hum. Rts. Comm. Concludes Consideration of U.S. Initial Report, supra
note 37, at 2.
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ratify the Covenant only undertake to submit periodic reports
to the Committee, and this implies little more than a dialogue
or exchange of information and views between the Committee
and state party. On the other hand, the United States has
made an additional declaration accepting the interstate peti-
tion mechanism created by article 41 of the Covenant. 193 It
has therefore manifested its willingness to participate in one of
the two contentious mechanisms falling within the competence
of the Committee.
194
The argument that the Committee has an inherent author-
ity to rule on the legality of reservations is on even more solid
ground in the context of the petition mechanisms. Surely a
petitioner state party is entitled, in the course of an interstate
petition, to invoke the invalidity of a reservation made by the
respondent state party. The Committee charged with adjudi-
cating such a complaint must take a position on the question.
In this context, it should be added that a state that volunteers
to participate in a mechanism, whereby an allegation of a
breach of the Covenant may be determined by the Committee,
should also be prepared to abide by the Committee's conclu-
sions in good faith and to adjust its legislation or practice in
accordance.
C. Consequences of the Illegality
The Committee has determined that the U.S. reservations
to articles 6, paragraph 5 and 7 of the Covenant are contrary
to the object and purpose of the treaty and consequently inval-
id. 95 If the reservations are illegal, the question becomes
whether the United States remains bound by the Covenant,
including articles 6 and 7. Examining the matter narrowly, it
would appear that the United States has never consented to be
bound by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant as far as the death
penalty is concerned. Accession to an international treaty is a
form of international contract, and a state cannot be bound to
obligations against its will. However, if the matter is examined
193. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 41,
999 U.N.T.S at 182.
194. The other being the individual petition mechanism created by the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art.
41, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181.
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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from another angle, it is also clear that the United States
intends generally to be bound by the Covenant. The issue is
one of severability or separability, that is, whether the reserva-
tions to articles 6, paragraph 5 and 7 can be dissociated from
the accession to the Covenant. If the answer is no, then the
United States is not a party to the Covenant. If the answer is
yes, then the United States is bound by the Covenant, includ-
ing articles 6 and 7. It is not plausible to conclude that the
United States should remain bound by the Covenant, with the
exception of the death penalty provisions, for this would mean
that the result is the same, whether or not the reservation is
illegal. As Judge R. St. John MacDonald of the European Court
of Human Rights has written, "[tlo exclude the application of
an obligation by reason of an invalid reservation is in effect to
give full force and effect to the reservation."9 '
When they formulate objections to reservations, states
sometimes indicate the consequences they attribute to the
illegal reservation. France objected to India's reservation to
article 1 of the Covenant, adding that the objection should not
be considered an obstacle to the instrument's entry into force
between the two parties. 9 7 Similar statements were made by
the Netherlands and the former Czechoslovakia concerning
Korea's reservation.'98 Yet some objections filed by Germany,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, make no comment
on the consequences.'99 Several of the European states which
have objected to the U.S. reservations to articles 6 and 7 of the
Covenant have stated that they do not consider the objection to
be an obstacle to the Covenant entering into force between
themselves and the United States. °0
The Vienna Convention seems to contemplate such state-
ments. It declares that: "[wlhen a State objecting to a reserva-
tion has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between
itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the res-
ervation relates do not apply as between the two States to the
196. R. St. J. MacDonald, Reservations Under the European Convention on
Human Rights, 21 REVUE DE BEIGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [RiB.D.I] 429, 449
(1988).
197. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1994, supra note 2, at
128.
198. Id. at 127-28.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 127-30.
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extent of the reservation."20' But for the grounds outlined
above dealing with reciprocity, this is obviously not the reason
why states have objected to the reservations of the United
States, and it is certainly not the reason why they have made
such statements. Rather, these declarations must be interpret-
ed as indicating the views of the objecting states to the effect
that the United States is bound by the entire Covenant, includ-
ing the illegally reserved provisions.
International tribunals have only rarely examined the
consequences of an illegal reservation to a multilateral treaty.
The matter was considered by Sir Hersh Lauterpacht of the
ICJ, in his separate opinion in the Norwegian Loans case." 2
France had formulated a reservation at the time of its declara-
tion, recognizing the competence of the ICJ. After finding the
reservation to be incompatible with the Statute of the ICJ,
Judge Lauterpacht addressed the issue of severability as a
"general principle of law," asking whether it was possible "hav-
ing regard to the intention of the parties and the nature of the
instrument" to sever the offending reservation from the decla-
ration as a whole." 3 Two years later, Judge Lauterpacht re-
visited the question in his dissenting opinion in the
Interhandel case.20 4 The judge sought to determine the intent
of the United States with respect to a reservation-known as
the "Connelly Amendment"-to the Declaration concerning
jurisdiction of the Court.0 ' A review of U.S. practice over
several decades left no doubt that it considered the issue of the
reservation to be a sine qua non of its acceptance of the treaty
as a whole.
If that reservation is an essential condition of the Acceptance
in the sense that without it the declaring State would have
been wholly unwilling to undertake the principal obligation,
then it is not open to the Court to disregard that reservation
and at the same time to hold the accepting State bound by
the Declaration."5
201. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 34, art. 21, % 3,
1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
202. Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 43-66 (July
6).
203. Id. at 56-57.
204. Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 21).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 117.
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Judge Lauterpacht made particular reference to the debates in
the Senate when advice and consent was given to the mat-
ter.2
07
In its 1988 judgment in Belilos v. Switzerland, the Europe-
an Court not only ruled that Switzerland's "reservation," (Swit-
zerland had called an "interpretative declaration") to article 6,
paragraph 1 of the European Convention was invalid, it went
on to find that Switzerland was bound by the European Con-
vention as a whole and that the "reservation" was therefore
severable from the ratification.2 ' The Court summarily con-
sidered the consequences, applying the test of intention of the
reserving state, and concluded that "it is beyond doubt that
Switzerland is, and regards itself as, bound by the Convention
irrespective of the validity of the declaration." 9 Counsel for
Switzerland had simplified matters for the European Commis-
sion when it admitted this during the oral hearing.21
There was no such admission from Turkey when the Euro-
pean Court ruled illegal its "reservations" to articles 25 and 46
of the European Convention in a judgment issued March 23,
1995, only a week prior to presentation by the United States of
its initial report to the Committee.21' In the Loizidou case,
Turkey's declarations recognizing the individual petition mech-
anism before the European Commission (article 25) and Euro-
pean Court (article 46) included statements to the effect that it
only applied in territory "to which the Constitution of the Re-
public of Turkey is applicable" or to the "national territory of
the Republic of Turkey."212 The declaration was objected to by
Greece, and several other states parties reserved their right to
object at a later date. 3 Subsequently, a series of petitions
207. Id. at 105 (citations omitted).
208. Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988)
209. Id. at 28. On the Belilos case, see MacDonald, supra note 196; Susan
Marks, Reservations Unhinged: The Belilos Case before the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 300 (1990).
210. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Doc. CourfMisc
(87) 237, 45 (verbatim record of the public hearings held on Oct. 26, 1987).
211. Loizidou v. Turkey, 131 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
212. 1987 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 8 (General Information).
213. It was also criticized by scholars. See e.g., lain Cameron, Turkey and Arti-
cle 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 887
(1988); Cohen-Jonathan, supra note 185; Claudio Zanghi, La Dclaration de la
turquie relative d l'article 25 de la Convention europdenne des droits de l'homme,
93 REV. GPN. D. INT'L PUB. 69 (1989); see also ZAIN M. NECATIGIL, THE CYPRUS
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from Greek Cypriots were filed with the European Commission
alleging various violations of their rights in the Turkish occu-
pied portions of northern Cyprus.214 The European Commis-
sion concluded that the declaration, which was a form of reser-
vation, was illegal, and that consequently an individual peti-
tion originating from occupied Cyprus was admissible.215
The Republic of Cyprus referred the Loizodou case to the
European Court. 16 Turkey appeared and argued that it par-
ticipated in the case as "amicus curia," but the European
Court, sitting as a Grand Chamber, properly qualified it as a
""respondent Government. 21  Relying for purposes of inter-
pretation on articles 31, paragraph 1 (ordinary meaning, in
context and in light of the object and purpose) and 31, para-
graph 3(b) (subsequent practice) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,"' and downplaying the significance of
the travaux pr~paratoires of the European Convention in favor
of a dynamic interpretation,219 the European Court held that
Turkey's reservations were invalid.2 As to the consequence
of this conclusion, Turkey had argued before the European
Court that if its reservations to its declarations under articles
25 and 46 were found to be invalid, then the declarations
themselves were inoperative." It was essential for the Euro-
pean Court to rule on this point because had Turkey been
right, then after affirming the invalidity of the reservations it
would be compelled to decline any further competence, the
right of individual petition being of no effect. On this point,
counsel for the Turkish government, Herbert Golsong, had
noted that when Turkey first accepted the competence of the
QUESTION AND THE TURKISH POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 147-150 (2d ed.
1993).
214. See, e.g., Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R.
215. Les restrictions faites par la turiquie concernant la reconnaissance de la
competence de la Commission selon l'article 25 CEDH sont invalides/Chrysostomos
et al. c. Turique, 3 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROrrS DE L IOMME [R.U.D.H.] 193
(1991).
216. Although not a party to the proceedings before the Commission, Cyprus
was entitled to refer the case to the Court pursuant to article 48(b) of the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights, supra note 29, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246.
217. Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15-16.
218. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 34, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 340.
219. Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23.




European Commission under article 25 in 1987, its delegate to
the Committee of Ministers had made a statement:
in which the Delegate underlined that it had to be clearly
understood that the conditions built into the Declaration are
so essential that disregarding any of them would make the
entire Declaration void and thus lead to the consequence of a
complete lapse of Turkey's acceptance of the right of indi-
vidual petition.2
Arguing the case in June 1994, Golsong insisted that he re-
peated the declaration for the purpose of article 46.' Fur-
thermore, he added that Turkey's position was the "exact oppo-
site" of Switzerland's in the Belilos case. 4
The European Court dismissed the importance of Turkey's
declarations to the effect that the illegal reservation could not
be severed from the declaration as a whole. The European
Court said Turkey "must have been aware" that there was a
consistent state practice of parties to the European Convention
to accept unconditionally the competence of the European
Commission and the European Court, and that its purported
reservations "were of questionable validity under the Conven-
tion and might be deemed impermissible by the Convention
organs."2' Moreover, the European Commission's view that
any territorial A la carte declaration recognizing the compe-
tence of the European Convention organs was invalid had been
expressed in pleadings during at least two earlier cases. 6 In
the view of the Grand Chamber of the European Court, both
the Greek objection and unfavorable reactions from Sweden,
Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, and Belgium to the Turkish
declaration lent further support to the position that Turkey
was well aware of its fragile position prior to making the decla-
rations. 27 "Seen in this light," concluded the Court, "the ex
post facto statements by Turkish representatives cannot be
relied upon to detract from the respondent Government's basic,
222. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUAN RIGHTS, Doe. Cour/Misc
(94) 271, 35 (verbatim Record of the hearing held on June 22, 1994).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 36.
225. Loizidou v. Turkey, 131 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1995).
226. Belgian Linguistics Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 432 (1967); Kjeldsen
v. Netherlands, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 119 (1978).
227. Loizidou, 131 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 28.
1995]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
albeit qualified, intention to accdpt the competence of the Com-
mission and Court."2 ' The "special character" of the Europe-
an Convention regime, which the European Court qualified as
one of an "instrument of European public order ('ordre
public')," therefore favored the severance of the invalid clauses
from the declaration, as this would ensure the rights and free-
doms enshrined in the European Convention for all areas fall-
ing within Turkey's jurisdiction.'
The European Court did not set aside the test of intention
in determining whether a reservation is severable. Rather, it
appears to highlight the difficulty in identifying such intention
and expresses a disregard for such factors as formal declara-
tions by the state. If the state ought to have been aware that
its reservations were of doubtful legality, then the European
Court suggests that it will be deemed to have accepted the fact
that such reservations might be declared invalid." This
awareness, says the European Court, indicates an intention to
be bound by the treaty whatever be the fate of its reserva-
tions. 2
Certain aspects of U.S. practice lend weight to the argu-
ment that its general intent is to be bound by the Covenant,
whatever the outcome of litigation concerning the legality of
the reservations. It is useful to recall that Washington fully
participated in the drafting of the American Convention"'
whose provisions are very similar to articles 6 and 7 of the
Covenant and were in fact inspired by them. Richard D.
Kearney, the U.S. representative intervened frequently in
Committee 1 of the San Jos6 Conference, held during Novem-
ber 1969. 3 Although briefly questioning the juvenile death
penalty and the exclusion of political crimes, he did not object
in substance to the provisions dealing with the death penalty
or torture. The United States signed the American Convention
on June 1, 1977 without reservation. 4 Pending ratification
228. Id.
229. Id. at 27.
230. Id. at 28.
231. Id.
232. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 41.
233. O.A.S. Doc. OAS/serYKXVI/1.2, doc. 36 (1969); OA.S. Doc.
OAS/ser.KJXVI/1.2, doc. 38, corr. 1 (1969); OA.S. Doc. OASfserYKXVII1.2, doc. 40,
corr. 1 (1969).
234. OA.S. Doc. OEA/ser. LIV/1.83, doc. 14, corr. 1, at 317 (1993).
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of the American Convention, it is bound by international law to
refrain from any acts that would defeat the object and purpose
of the American ConventionY
In 1987, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
found the United States to be in breach of the American Decla-
ration of Human Rights with respect to imposition of the juve-
nile death penaltyY6 The United States was bound by the
provisions of the Declaration by virtue of the Charter of the
Organization of American States (Charter), as amended. ' The
United States has been free to denounce the Charter in re-
sponse to this ruling, but has not done so.
Finally, in February 1995, the United States signed the
Convention on the Rights of the Child"8 without formulating
any reservations. Article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child essentially repeats the norm against juvenile exe-
cutions found in article 6, paragraph 5 of the Covenant. At the
time, the United States knew from the objections by the Euro-
pean states, that many considered its reservations concerning
juvenile executions to be inadmissible. Furthermore, a few
months prior to signature of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the Committee had announced that reservations
concerning execution of children were incompatible with rules
of customary international law."
These elements of recent U.S. practice with respect to
similar and related human rights instruments demonstrate
that its government considers the sum to be more important
than its parts. Therefore, the general intent of the United
States is to assume the norms embodied in the Covenant, even
if its reservations concerning the death penalty are deemed
inadmissible.
235. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 34, art. 18, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 336.
236. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.HR. 61, 82, 61, OEA/ser. LIV/II.71, doe. 9
rev.1 (1987)
237. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119
U.N.T.S. 48 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951); Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721 U.N.T.S. 32 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1970) (amend-
ments to the Charter of Organization of American States); Case 2141, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 6, OEA/ser. L.V/II.52 doc. 48 (1984).
238. Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States is a Party,
34 I.L.M. 847 (1995) (United States signed the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on February 16, 1995).
239. See General Comment, supra note 75.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Committee's conclusion that the U.S. reservations to
articles 6, paragraph 5 and 7 of the Covenant are invalid is
supported by recognized sources of international law, including
legal scholarship, caselaw and state practice. The Committee is
silent as to the consequences of its ruling, although other au-
thorities, notably a recent judgment of the European Court,"
as well as the objections of other states parties,24 suggest
that the United States is bound at law by the Covenant as a
whole, including articles 6, paragraph 5 and 7.
With respect to article 6, paragraph 5, as there have been
several juvenile executions since the Covenant came into force
for the United States in September 1992, clear breaches of
international law can be established.242 In the case of article
7, because the Committee has already ruled that the gas cham-
ber constitutes torture or inhuman treatment or punish-
ment,24 cases where this method of execution has been used
since September, 1992 must also be added to the list of Cove-
nant violations. As to the "death row phenomenon," the
Committee's views appear to be in flux, and it may soon be
ready to find violations on this ground as well.
The Committee does not address the legality of the reser-
vation to article 6 as a whole, leaving some uncertainty as to
its position. There is no doubt that the United States also
intended to reserve the "most serious crimes" provision in
article 6, paragraph 2. Although the Committee says it is "con-
cerned by the excessive number of offenses punishable by the
death penalty in a number of States," it does not pronounce
itself on this aspect of the reservation.244 The Committee also
expresses its preoccupation with the execution of the mentally
retarded. 5 Yet the broad reservation to article 6 also has the
effect of excluding the issue of such executions from the obliga-
tions assumed by the United States. The Committee ought to
have declared that the reservation to article 6 as a whole, as
240. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
242. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEVELOPMENTS ON
THE DEATH PENALTY DURING 1994 at 12-13 (1995).
243. See Communication No. 46911991, supra note 8.





These criticisms notwithstanding, the Committee has
shown unaccustomed boldness in its views on the issue of res-
ervations in general and on the U.S. reservations in particular.
The clarification of the issues that the Committee has already
provided will hopefully have an influence upon public opinion
in the United States. The accession to the Covenant, after
decades of isolationism, indicated a recognition by the United
States that its previous indifference to contemporary interna-
tional human rights law was a source of embarrassment and
had become a political liability.246 The guardians of that law,
the Committee, have now indicated that the United States will
have to pay a price for this. It will be declared in breach of
international law for human rights violations committed with-
in its own territory, unless it is prepared to adjust its domestic
legislation to the fundamental norms set out in articles 6 and 7
of the Covenant, notably by putting an end to juvenile execu-
tions.
246. There already has been some negative reaction in the Senate to the con-
clusions of the Committee on the subject of the reservation by the United States.
An amendment to legislation providing for appropriations to the State Department,
presented to the Senate in June 1995, notes that the purpose of the Committee's
position on the reservations "is to seek to nullify as a matter of international law
the reservations, understandings, declarations, and proviso contained in the Senate
resolution of ratification thereby purporting to impose legal obligations on the
United States never accepted by the United States." S. REP. No. 95, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 314(a)(5) (1995) (Draft of Bill S. 908), available in
>httpd/rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query. The amendment goes on to restrict any expenditure
of funds relating to procedure before the Committee until the Committee changes
its position on the subject of reservations and "expressly recognize[s] the validity
as a matter of international law of the reservations, understandings, and declara-
tions contained in the United States instrument of ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Id. § 314(b)(2)(B).
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